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Abstract  
The current structure of agricultural production is still influenced by historical coupled 
payments, even though it has been eight years since decoupled payments were introduced. 
Much of the expansion in the Irish cattle herd that occurred during the era of the MacSharry 
reforms is still visible. In this paper we consider the incentives associated with the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) over time in relation to production. Our primary focus is on 
subsidies that were available to the beef sector, and we investigate the behavioural pressures 
associated with these incentives.  We have developed a Hypothetical microsimulation model 
using a typical farm, based on plausible values taken from the Teagasc National Farm Survey 
(NFS) 1995. We are investigating if subsidies available to the beef sector in Ireland through 
the CAP since 1984 resulted in non-linearity in the Direct Payment Schedule faced by cattle 
farmers, and if so where were these kinks and what were the behavioural pressures associated 
with these incentives? Identifying non-linearity in the Direct Payment Schedule indicates 
where incentives occurred.  Large kinks are associated with large incentives at that point. We 
calculated a total payment for each subsidy from 1984 to 2014, and constructed a Direct 
Payment Schedule that varies by stocking rate. We find that subsidies, and in particular the 
CAP reform payments of the MacSharry era introduced large discontinuities or kink points in 
the Direct Payment Schedule of beef farmers, indicating that there were large incentives for 
farmers to produce at or just before these points. 
JEL Classification: 
Key Words: Direct Payments, Incentives, Subsidy, CAP 
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Policy Incentives as Behavioural Drivers of Beef Enterprises in Ireland: Where are the 
Kinks? 
1. Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) enjoys a reputation not 
only as the oldest Community policy (Piccinini and Loseby, 2001) but also as a highly 
complex, evolving and expensive policy for European taxpayers. (Zhu and Lansink, 2010). 
In this paper we investigate the behavioural pressures associated with historical direct 
payments to beef farmers. Our research covers the period 1984 -2014, which can be divided 
into three distinct policy regimes. The first period (1982-1992) which we call the Pre 
MacSharry period, was a time when Market Policy instruments were in place. These 
instruments included intervention pricing, export subsidies and import levies. These policies 
boosted farm incomes by enabling farmers to sell their produce at prices above world 
prices.(Ewing, 1985; Daugbjerg, 2007; Swinbank, 1980)  
The second period (1993-2004) which we call the MacSharry Era was a period in which 
farmers received direct payments coupled to production. This was the first major shift in 
policy. A number of different production based subsidies (premium payments) were 
introduced as outlined in Table 1. Eligibility criteria varied for each different payment, but a 
maximum stocking rate limit, measured as livestock unit per hectare, was applicable to all. 
(Hill, 1992; Fennell, 1992; Cardwell, 2002) 
The third period under consideration (2004-2014) is a period of decoupled direct payments, 
The Single Farm Payment Scheme (SFP).  These payments were based on a historical 
reference period and the number of coupled direct payments drawn during that time. When 
the SFP was introduced many predicted the abandonment of land and the emergence of 
entitlement farmers. This did not happen, and the question remains as to why farmers in 
receipt of SFP continued to produce beef when it seemed unprofitable to do so. (Daugbjerg, 
2006; Swinnen, 2010; Hennessy and Thorne, 2005) 
There is a vast literature exploring the economic performance of an agricultural sector in 
which support policies are in place. Agricultural support policies impact in a number of ways 
on farm production: changes in relative output / input prices (Lansink and Peerlings, 1996) 
changes in input use (Serra et al., 2005b), changes in investment (Hennessy, 1998) and labour 
supply decisions (Woldehanna et al., 2000, Hennessy and Rehman, 2008, Serra et al., 2005a) 
and changes in farm exit and entry decisions. (Pietola et al., 2003).     
Subsidies may result in allocative inefficiencies or investment-induced productivity gains 
(Rizov et al., 2013). Allocative inefficiencies arise if farmers modify their behaviour in order 
to avail of subsidies. This is referred to as subsidy-seeking behaviour and can lead to 
inefficiencies in relation to input choices and uses, where farms overinvest in subsidised 
inputs. Subsidies may also give rise to technical inefficiencies whereby higher profits may 
lead to a lack of effort in seeking cost cutting methods. By increasing wealth, subsidies may 
also introduce soft budget constraints and farms may be slower to adjust production systems. 
If producers face hard budget constraints then they will adjust to external influences much 
quicker. (Rizov et al., 2013). 
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Coupled payments, directly linked to production, may distort decisions towards subsidised 
activities which may be less profitable from a market perspective. In contrast decoupled 
payments break the link between production and payments.(Rizov et al., 2013) 
Hennessy (1998) decompose the impacts of decoupled income support policies into wealth, 
insurance and coupling effects. A wealth effect arising from direct payments which increase 
income, an insurance effect in which the risk associated with agricultural production is 
lessened and a coupled effect if the support policy is explicitly linked to production. 
However, there has not been a forensic examination of policy instruments as drivers of 
farmer behaviour. In this paper we investigate the incentives associated with direct payments 
to beef farmers in Ireland. 
2. Structural Trends In Irish Agriculture 
In this section we outline the importance of the beef sector to Irish agriculture and take a look 
at the trends in breeding stock over time.  
The beef sector is the largest sector in Irish agriculture both in terms of the number of farmers 
and the area of land dedicated to beef production. Teagasc NFS has collected data on Irish 
farms for 40 years and in 2013 over 50% of Irish farms are categorised as cattle rearing 
(suckler) farms or cattle other (finishing) farms. (NFS, 2013) However, farms categorised as 
Dairy or Tillage also engage in some cattle farming and so 79% of all Irish farms in 2013 had 
some cattle enterprise on their farm. (NFS, 2013). .Over 90% of Irish Beef is exported which 
makes Ireland the largest exporter of beef in Europe and the fifth largest exporter in the 
world.(ref) The sector has also been plagued by low profitability with low viability issues, 
raising questions as to why, in the presence of decoupled direct payments, beef farmers 
continue to do what they do. Are Irish beef producers using decoupled direct payments to 
subsidise non-profitable enterprises? 
In 1984 a milk quota was introduced to curtail overproduction in the dairy sector. In 
conjunction a payment for suckler cows incentivised beef farmers to increase production. 
Figure1 illustrates the structural changes that occurred in cow numbers in Ireland from 1975 -
2011.  
 
Figure 1.  Changes in cow numbers     
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With the introduction of the Dairy quota in 1984 dairy cow numbers began to decrease from 
just over 1.5 million cows in 1983 to 1 million in 2009. In 1983 a suckler cow payment was 
introduced but the payment was relatively low at £25 per cow. In 1987 this payment 
increased three fold to £75 and suckler cow numbers began to increase dramatically. In 1993, 
as part of the MacSharry reform payments a suckler cow quota was introduced based on the 
number of suckler cows in the herd in 1992. The introduction of this quota and conditions for 
eligibility were announced well in advance, and suckler cow numbers increased further in 
anticipation of this measure.  This quota was not a production quota, it did not limit the 
number of suckler cows in the herd, it was a quota on the number of entitlements to payments 
on the farm. For example if a farmer had ten cows in 1992 then he was only eligible to draw 
payments on ten cows from 1993 onwards, the farm may keep more than ten cows but was 
only paid for ten. It would seem strange for farmers to increase the number of suckler cow in 
the herd if they were not receiving premium payments on them, yet from 1993-1999 suckler 
cow numbers continued to rise.(Matthews, 2000). This may be due to the other premium 
payments on ten month and twenty-two month steers available at the time.  
From the late nineties on we can see a levelling out of suckler cow numbers with a slight 
increase in 2008 when a Suckler Welfare scheme was reintroduced. Dairy cow numbers have 
begun to increase slightly in recent years in anticipation of the removal of Dairy quota in 
2015.  
Between 1987 and 1998, the total number of cows increased by approx. 29%. However 
suckler cow numbers increased by 162% during the same period, a quite dramatic shift 
towards a more inefficient system of beef production. 
Today we have a beef sector characterised by low profit enterprises, situated in disadvantaged 
areas, where farms are smaller than average, and beef farmers have a higher age profile than 
farmers in the more profitable dairy and tillage sectors. Increasing profitability on suckler 
farms remains an issue, and the sustainability of many of these farms is a concern for farmers 
and policy makers alike. 
Many commentators predict that market conditions alone will not be enough to increase the 
profitability of beef farming, structural changes are necessary. In order to understand the 
nature of these structural changes it is first necessary to understand the behavioural pressures 
associated with historical direct payments that helped to create the present situation.  
3. Theoretical Section 
In this section, we outline the theoretical framework on which our research is based. Utility 
maximizing techniques are based on maximising a utility function subject to some constraint. 
If these constraints are non-linear the process becomes more difficult from an econometric 
point of view, but from a policy design perspective identifying these kink points can be useful 
as indicators of where the incentives occur. 
Theory of Kinked Budget Sets 
The analysis of labour supply responses to changes in the tax system has resulted in a large 
body of research on the subject.(Saez, 2010; Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Hausman, 1980; 
Hausman, 1979; Moffitt, 1990). Studies have shown that progressive income tax or benefit 
transfer systems introduce piece wise linear budget sets which create difficulties in deriving 
labour supply responses based on utility maximizing techniques. Our research has shown that 
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historical payments to farmers introduced similar non-linarites and while labour responses are 
not the focus of this paper similar techniques can be applied to uncover underlying farmer 
preferences. Theory predicts that agents will choose to supply labour until the marginal 
disutility of labour becomes equal to the marginal benefits. In 1978 Burtless and Hausman 
developed a method known as the non-linear budget set estimation method which states that 
if agents are utility maximising then they must be on the linear part of the budget set or at a 
convex kink point. This method examines the behavioural response to a policy change. 
(Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Moffitt, 1990; Saez, 2010).  
 
Figure 2. Indifference curves and bunching 
Source: Saez; 2010 
Figure 2 displays the effect on earnings choices of introducing a (small) kink at the budget set 
by increasing the tax rate t by dt above income level z*. Individual L chooses z* before the 
reform, and stays at z* after the reform. Individual H chooses z*+dz before the reform, but 
moves to z* after the reform. (Saez, 2010) 
This illustrates how a change in policy affects individuals in different ways depending on 
their initial position along the constraint. If preferences are “well behaved” and evenly 
distributed then after a policy change theory predicts the individual at the higher level on the 
constraint will adjust their behaviour. By plotting the distribution of earnings we should 
observe bunching of individuals at or just before the kink point. 
In the context of this paper we are focused on identifying where the non-linearity’s occurred 
in the Direct Payments Schedule of beef farmers. This is a first but crucial step in our 
research  
4. Methodology – Hypothetical Farm Level Modelling 
This section describes the methodology used in this paper. We have adopted a hypothetical 
microsimulation approach based on a typical farm model from which we uncover a Direct 
Payments Schedule for each year from 1984-2014 across a range of stocking rates  
The model used in this research is based on the Typical Farm methodology developed by The 
International Farm Comparison Network (IFCN). The IFCN typical farm model is a unique 
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methodology that provides a realistic and up-to-date data-base of different farm types in 
several different regions. A typical beef farm is representative of the beef farms within the 
region in terms of size, crops grown, livestock systems, labour organisation and production 
technology used. The technical and economic data used to describe the typical farm is neither 
individual farm data nor statistical averages, but is based on a consensus achieved in a panel 
meeting consisting of farmers an advisor and a scientist.(Deblitz, 2005) There are a number 
of advantages to using this approach. Firstly, the cost of collecting farm level data on a 
regular basis is hugely expensive and therefore the typical farm concept offers a realistic 
alternative. Secondly, understanding agricultural production systems and farmer’s decision 
making requires an accurate picture of the real farm situation, but the use of individual case 
studies will invariably contain some particularities.  
We extend the scope of the IFCN approach which looks at a typical/representative farm at a 
single point in time in that we look at changes in the Direct Payments Schedule across time. 
Therefore our approach incorporates an inter temporal dimension  
Structure of Teagasc Typical Farm Model 
The Teagasc Typical Farm Model is a Hypothetical microsimulation model, constructed 
using actual NFS data from 1995, from which a stylised but plausible farm scenario is 
developed. “As a modelling framework, microsimulation modelling is a mechanism of 
abstracting from reality to help us understand complexity better”.(O'Donoghue, 2014) The 
unit of measurement is the farm, and at the farm level there a number of issues that add to this 
complexity. In particular the complexity of modeling at farm level stems from the fact that there 
exists a large degree of population and behaviour heterogeneity.  
By using a microsimulation approach it allows us to focus on a single dimension of 
complexity, the policy. This is a novel approach to abstracting from the level of heterogeneity 
at farm level and the subsequent issues of aggregation bias associated with such 
heterogeneity. Individual farmers, producing at different stocking rates, create a different 
direct payments schedule for each farm. By adopting a static typical farm methodology we 
abstract from the complexity and create an optimal direct payments schedule which identifies 
the optimal stocking rate to maximise direct payments. All farmers faced the same rules so all 
farmers could in theory adopt their behaviour to maximise their direct payments. 
The parameter used is Stocking Rate which is a measure of the intensive/extensive nature of 
the farm and is calculated as Livestock Unit per Hectare (Lu/Ha).  All subsidies are applied to 
the static farm over the period 1984-2012. Stocking rates are allowed to vary across a range 
from 0.1 Lu/Ha to 3.1 Lu/Ha. Total payments from all subsidies are then used to create a 
Direct Payments Schedule which represents the marginal rate of return to the farm from all 
subsidies. Where rules in the conditions of a subsidy change, an increase/decrease in 
payment, a stocking rate limit is reached or a maximum payment per farm/Hectare is reached, 
the marginal return to the farm changes thus creating a change in the slope of the Direct 
Payments Schedule. This change creates what is referred to in the literature as a kink point.  
The Model in Excel 
We began developing the model in excel, where each subsidy is defined by a set of 
parameters which are outlined in the conditions for eligibility as laid down by the Department 
of Agriculture under EU guidelines and Directives. For each individual subsidy, if the farmer 
is eligible, a total payment is then calculated which is allocated to the farm according to the 
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livestock unit share. For example the Suckler Cow Premium total payment is calculated based 
on a maximum stocking rate eligibility of 2 Lu/Ha and this payment is then allocated on a 
range of stocking rates from 0.1 Lu/Ha up to 3.1 Lu/Ha. When the stocking rate reaches 2 
Lu/Ha payment ceases, thus creating a change in the total payment graph where up to that 
point the graph is increasing, at 2 Lu/Ha the graph becomes horizontal.  
In calculating the payment for Single Farm Payments an average of 2000 2001 and 2002 was 
applied to total subsidies drawn during this reference period. These included Suckler Cow 
Premium, Special Beef Premiums (10 and 22 month) Special Bull Beef Premium, Ewe 
Premium, Rural World Premium, Extensification Premium, Slaughter Premium, National 
Top Ups and additional payments for heifers which did not qualify for payments during the 
reference period.  
Having calculated all payments for all individual subsidies, total payments for each year and 
associated graphs which illustrate the return to farming from all subsidies were calculated 
5. Results 
This section presents the results from the model for a hypothetical farm where livestock 
numbers remain constant over the entire period. In the confines of this paper we present 
results from direct payments which were available to all farmers. We do not include Less 
Favoured Area Payments or Environmental Payments, but form our research we have found 
that these payments increased the overall level of payments linearly, that is they increased the 
level of payments but did not create any additional kink points in the schedule. 
Marginal Changes 1984-2014 
Figure 3 represents the marginal changes year on year in total payments at 101 different 
livestock units per ha that range from 0.1 Lu/Ha to 3.1 Lu/Ha in increments of 0.03. Each line 
represents a different stocking rate. In the Pre MacSharry period (1984-1992) we see a 
marginal increase in payments in 1987 and again in 1989. The payments available at this time 
are illustrated in Table3. These marginal increases were due to changes in the eligibility 
criteria for male animals where the maximum number of animals eligible for a beef 
derogation payment increased from 50 to 90 animals. There was also an increase in the 
amount paid for suckler cows but the overall level of payments during this time was 
relatively low compared to those in the next period of coupled payments. 
 During the MacSharry Era (1993-2004) we see substantial marginal increases in payments 
when the schemes in Table 1 were first introduced in 1993. These increases were graduated 
with those at lower stocking rates (up to 1.4 Lu/Ha) receiving the largest marginal increase in 
payments year on year with an increase of over 200%. Farmers producing at stocking rates 
above 2 Lu/Ha received the lowest marginal increase (50%). Farmers producing between 1.4 
Lu/Ha and 2Lu/Ha saw an increase of 150% in their payments between 1992 and 1993. 
Between 1993 -1996 those at very high stocking rates experienced negative marginal changes 
as the upper stocking rate limit reduced from an initial high of 3.5 Lu/Ha to 2Lu/Ha over a 
period of four years. However there were little if any cattle farmers producing at these very 
high stocking densities. From 1997 onwards the marginal changes across all stocking rates 
are relatively stable with some variation in the years preceding the introduction of decoupled 
payments in 2005, and again in 2008 when the Suckler Welfare Scheme was introduced. 





Figure 3. Marginal changes in total payments year on year 
Pre MacSharry Era 1984-1992 
During the Pre MacSharry period a policy of market support existed, but there were also a 
number of direct payments available as outlined in Table 3. Figure 4.shows how total 
payments increased as animal numbers increased For the most part these payments were 
linear in nature so as animal numbers increases total payments increased. Exceptions to this 
existed in 1987 and 1988 when the maximum number of animals on which Beef Derogation 
Premiums could be drawn was 50 male animals, thus creating a kink point at 2.35 Lu/Ha This 
limit increased to 90 male animals in 1989 and the Direct Payments Schedule reverts to the 
linear nature indicating that the more you produced the higher direct payments you received. 
The overall level of payments in this period was relatively low, for example the highest level 
of payment in 1988 was at a stocking rate of 2.35 Lu/Ha of €2,000,
1
 However, the majority of 
Irish farms were producing at stocking rates much lower than this. 
 
Figure 4. Figure Total payments Pre MacSharry Era 
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The MacSharry Era 1993-2004 
Figure 5 shows the level of increase in total payments from 1993-2004. The complexity and 
hectic nature of this period are evident, both in terms of the number of new payments and the 
eligibility rules for different subsidy payments. These conditions introduced a number of kink 
points in the Direct Payments Schedule where stocking rate limits were reached. Payments 
available at this time are illustrated in Table 1. 
In 1993 there are two kinks in the schedule, at 1.4 Lu/Ha where the Extensification Premium 
limit is reached and again at 1.9Lu/Ha where the Slaughter Premium limit is reached. 
Farmers still received payments on Special Beef Premiums and Suckler Cow Premiums up to 
3.5 Lu/Ha at this time. There is also very little advantage to increasing from 1.4 Lu/Ha as the 
maximum payment at 1.9 Lu/Ha is only €500 greater but the loss of increasing above 1.9 
Lu/Ha is over €1,500 at that time.  
By 2004 on the eve of the introduction of decoupled payments there are three distinct kinks in 
the Direct Payments Schedule. The first two kinks are at two different levels of 
Extensification. The first kink is at 1 Lu/Ha where farmers received a higher payment if their 
stocking rate was less than 1 Lu/Ha and the second Extensification premium at 1.4 Lu/Ha. 
Slaughter Premiums had reduced to 1.8Lu/Ha creating a minor kink and the final kink and 
both the Suckler Cow Premium and the Special Beef Premia had an upper limit of 1.9 Lu/Ha. 
By Increasing stocking rates above this upper limit farmers were receiving less direct 
payments per hectare than if they were producing at 1 Lu/Ha  
 
Figure 5.  Total payments MacSharry Era 
Figure 6 relates the marginal changes as stocking rate increases in both 1993 when coupled 
direct payments were first introduced and 2004 the last year of coupled payments. In both 
years the highest marginal changes were at very low stocking rates. So for example 
increasing the stocking rate from 0.1 Lu/Ha to 0.13 Lu/Ha resulted in an increase in total 
payments of 20%. This marginal rate of change remains positive but decreasing up to 1.4 
Lu/Ha in 1993 corresponding to the first kink point in Figure 5, which implies that increasing 










































































































at to 1 Lu/Ha, also corresponding to the first kink in the Direct Payments Schedule in Figure 
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Figure 6.  Marginal changes per livestock unit MacSharry Era 
Single Farm Payments 2005-2014 
Figure 7 shows the level of increase in total payments from 2005-2014. Although these 
payments were decoupled from production, payments were based on production levels during 
a historical reference period (200-2002) hence payments maintain the same shape.as during 
MacSharry era. This highlights the distortionary nature of these payments whereby those who 
produced most during the reference period also received higher decoupled payments. 
 
Figure 7.  Total payments per livestock unit Single Farm Payments 
Figure 8 shows the marginal changes year on year from 2003 -2014. Producers at all stocking 
rates up to 1.9 Lu/Ha saw a 20% drop in payments when the Single Farm Payment Scheme 
was first introduced in 2005. There was a 10% drop in payments at stocking rates between 
1.9 and 1.96 Lu/Ha and above this stocking rate there were no changes in payments year on 
year. In 2008 there was an increase in payments at all stocking rates following the 
introduction of the Suckler Welfare Scheme which was a coupled payment specifically 





































































































































































































were no coupled payments available to suckler farmers and farmers only received a single 
farm payment. 
 
Figure 8.  Marginal changes per livestock unit Single Farm Payment 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the behavioural pressures associated with historical direct 
payments to beef farmers in Ireland. Our primary focus is on subsidies that were available to 
the beef sector, and we investigate the behavioural pressures associated with these incentives.  
We have developed a Hypothetical microsimulation model using a typical farm, based on 
plausible values taken from the Teagasc National Farm Survey (NFS) 1995. 
We have found that subsidies paid to farmers created substantial kinks in the Direct Payments 
schedule of beef farmers in Ireland. Large kinks are associated with large behavioural 
pressures at that point. These behavioural pressures are particularly evident in the MacSharry 
Era 1993-2004, when coupled direct payments were first introduced. The complexity of this 
era both in terms of the number of new subsidies and the constant changing of conditions for 
eligibility increased the difficulty for farmers in making decisions. 
Identifying the points where subsidies created non-linarites in the historical budget 
constraints of beef farmers helps us to understand where the behavioural incentives occurred. 
This is a first but important stage in developing a Utility Maximising framework for beef 
farmers in Ireland. It is clear from the trends in cattle numbers that Irish farmers reacted to 
these incentives. What is not so clear is why we have not seen any dramatic changes in the 
structure since the introduction of decoupled payments. Clearly there is a level of utility 
associated with cattle farming that goes beyond a purely monetary gain.  
A better understanding of past behaviour is essential to understanding how policy instruments 
in the future might be used to bring about changes in agricultural production systems.  
The next stage in this process is to investigate, using NFS data on actual farmer decisions, 
whether beef farmers in Ireland bunched at these kink points as theory would suggest they 
should. According to Moffitt (1990) it is important in policy design to know the distribution 
of individuals over the constraint, as different people on different parts on the constraint react 
to changes in different ways. “The net effect of a policy change may well depend critically 



















































Table 1. MacSharry Cap Reform Payments 1993 
Suckler Cow Premium  Individual farm quota based on the number of suckler cows held in 
1992. Payment per head. Upper stocking rate limit per farm of 
3.5Lu/Ha in 1993 which reduced to 2Lu/Ha by 1996 
£79 (€100) 
Special Beef Premium Paid in two instalments on steer cattle at 10 months and 22 months. 
Payment per head. Upper limit of 90 animals increasing to 180 
animals in 2000. Upper stocking rate limit similar to suckler cow 
premium.  
£52.73 (€67) 
Slaughter Premium Paid automatically on the number of animals slaughtered. Payment 
per head. No limit on the number of animals eligible. Stocking rate 
limit per farm 1.8 Lu/Ha 
£52.73 (€67) 
Extensification Premium Paid automatically on suckler cows or male animals if a stocking 
rate per farm of 1.4 Lu/Ha or lower is achieved 
£26.36 (€33) 
Ewe Premium  Individual farm quota based on the number of Ewes held in 1992. 
Payment per head. Minimum stocking rate of 10 ewes Upper limit 
of 1000 in Less Favoured Areas and 500 in Non Less Favoured 
Areas 
£17 (€21) 
Rural World Premium Extra payment to farmers in less favoured areas. Payment per head. 
No limit. 
£5.25(€6.60) 
Source: Teagasc Management Data for Farming, Teagasc, various years 
Table 2.  Payments available in Less Favoured Area (1992) 
Animal Category LFA Subsidy 
Cattle Headage (MSH) £40 on first 8 LUs.  £33 for each LU from 9-30 LU’s 
Beef-cow headage (MSH) £84 per cow. Maximum number of cows: 40 
Beef Cow Scheme (LSH) £75 per cow. Maximum number of cows: 30 
Sheep headage (MSH) and (LSH) £10/ewe for first 200 ewes. Max payment £2,000/farm 
Source: Teagasc, various years. Teagasc Management Data for Farm Planning 
Table 3. Direct payments available to all farmers prior to 1993 (payments  in 1992) 
Suckler Cow Premium No limit £52.73 per head 
Beef Premium Derogation Male cattle over 9 months. Max 90 
head 
£35.15 per head 
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